A well-site leader and BP employee testified before the US Coast Guard investigatory committee that there was a problem with a safety device on the drilling rig; he reported the problem; but drilling presumably continued in a complete disregard for any attention to the problem.

Ronald Sepulvado testified that he reported a problem with the control pod connected to the blow-out preventer and could not understand why drilling continued or the company ignored his report. Ironically, Mr. Sepulvado was not on board the rig at the time of the explosion because he was attending a blow-out preventer safety training program.

The best guess is Mr. Sepulvado is talking about the shuttle valve located inside the Blind Shear Ram on the drilling pipe. The operation of this unit, as well as the entire component, is superbly illustrated on the New York Times website. Once again, the Times provide wonderful insight into this issue.

A failure of the shuttle valve can result in a malfunction of the blind ram shear. Imagine the drill pipe going down to the well head at the bottom of the ocean and on the well head is a hydraulically activated set of arms that, in the event of an emergency, should activate to cut the drill pipe, crimp the end of the pipe where oil flows and create a seal to prevent oil from blowing out into the entire Gulf.

Illustration Courtesy of NY Times Website

The Blow-out preventer can be activated in essentially (4) ways:

• Electrical Control Signal: sent from the surface through a control cable;
• Acoustical Control Signal: sent from the surface based on a modulated/encoded pulse of sound transmitted by an underwater transducer;
• ROV Intervention: remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) mechanically control valves and provide hydraulic pressure to the stack (via “hot stab” panels);
• Deadman Switch / Auto Shear: fail-safe activation of selected BOPs during an emergency, and if the control, power and hydraulic lines have been severed.

In the United States waters, oil rig operators such as BP and owners, such as Transocean, are permitted to outfit the rigs with only electrical controls, avoiding the deployment of acoustical controls. The omission of acoustical controls transmits into a savings of up to $500,000 per unit. Since rigs sometimes require replacement of these units, omitting the acoustical control can actually result in even more savings.

We can only reflect and wish that BP or Transocean had seen the wisdom of employing all of the safety mechanisms available to have avoided this disaster or that BP had listened to the voice in the wilderness of its own employee, Ronald Sepulvado.

Hearings have been occurring in connection with the investigation of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and the Gulf Oil Disaster. Hearings have been held in New Orleans jointly by the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.

Many of the revelations coming out of the testimony at the hearings are interesting, but witnesses who have refused to appear or those who have been reticent to testify on certain matters are also of note.

A BP lawyer testified that the Deepwater Horizon had 390 “past due” maintenance items that should have been corrected and, which were found during a September 2009 audit of the rig. The lawyer testified that the corrections would have required 3,545 man hours to complete. All this data was set forth in a 30 page report submitted to the rig owner, Transocean, long before the tragic explosion on April 20, 2010.

Also testifying was Stephen Bertone, the chief engineer of the Deepwater Horizon rig. He testified that (8) months before the explosion the rig’s propeller that assisted in maneuvering the rig had been “having problems”. Bertone could not recall how many of the 390 deficiencies on the oil rig had been corrected before the explosion and subsequent oil spill.

Bertone also testified that he did not recall whether the general alarm had been bypassed, but did not recall hearing it go off. Bertone said he did not know whether the system for purging gas from the drill shack had been bypassed. This system was the one that kept gas from accumulating and what ultimately ended up igniting the massive explosion that did occur.

Stephen Bertone does recall that hours before the deadly blowout at BP’s Macondo well, a larger than normal number of crew members was gathered in the drilling control room on board the Deepwater Horizon.

“At that point I knew there was something going on, but I didn’t know what it was,” Bertone said.

The visit to the rig’s drill shack, where it was “standing room only,” took place about 5:30 pm, he said.

Later, shortly before 10 p.m., Bertone was reading in his bed when he heard what sounded like a freight train running through his room, then a boom. He felt thumping and saw the lights go out. That set up a chain of events that eventually led to a frenzied exit from the fiery rig.

Wouldn’t it be interesting to inquire with Bertone whether he may have asked, “gee, what is everyone here about” or “what’s the problem”, or hey, guys, what’s up”? Instead, all we know is he went to bed to read.

Bertone said he does recall reviewing an audit before the accident that found larger maintenance issues requiring Deepwater Horizon to go to the shipyard in early 2011 for work on thrusters, engines, seawater systems, ballast systems and drilling equipment.

Mike Williams, a subordinate of Stephen Bertone’s, suggested that some key safety functions on board the rig were set to bypass when the accident occurred.

BP’s well-site manager, Donald Vidrine, declined to testify at the hearings; reportedly due to health concerns.

So far, what we have in the testimony seems to be a frightening inventory of neglect and carelessness on at least the part of the rig operator, BP and the rig owner, Transocean. There seems to be at least some scintilla of suspicion that any of the neglected problems on the Deepwater Horizon may have cause d or contributed to this tragedy. There also seems to be some concern that memories are not as sharp as maybe we had hoped or honesty is in short supply.