Remember the days when you drove your car into a “service station” and you simply expected that, in addition to gas, you would receive, well, service?

When I was a boy, I would often go to the gas station with my Dad. Back then, it was not just about gasoline. The gas would be pumped for him; his windows would be washed; and all the necessaries under the hood would be carefully examined for problems; he might even get some service work done. My Dad knew the gas station attendant by name and would “shoot the breeze” with him about everything from baseball to politics. Ah, the good ole days: when men were men and service station attendants were professionals.

Well as they say, yes, times they have changed.

Now, when you go to get gasoline there are no professionals. No one meets you at the pump and you, the consumer, have become the gas station attendant in some respects. Now, the “station attendant” is likely the poor guy or gal putting up the signs for the 29 cent hot dog, while keeping the slushy and coffee machines filled to the brim! They are the people selling lottery tickets and paying off the winners. Station attendants now are more a combination grocer, coffee shop person and numbers runner than they are anyone the least bit skilled in the very sensitive trade of dealing with flammable and explosive liquids.

I guess when it comes to one of the most dangerous flammable and combustible liquid/gas mixture in our society Big Oil and Big Business want to add a degree of difficulty to keep it exciting. Thanks, but no thanks….

Seriously, I cannot tell you how many times I have heard about or actually witnessed gasoline overflowing out the gas tank of an unattended car or on to an unsuspecting consumer.

Most often, the emergency of over flowing flammable liquids is the result of broken automatic cut off valve. This is both a serious occurrence and one that requires some amount of professional knowledge. Sadly, we can not, in all fairness, expect the grocer, coffee person, numbers runner to really have the expertise to properly identify the malfunction as a serious occurrence and have the specialized knowledge to know how to fix it. Certainly, shutting down a malfunctioning pump is not a call that a clerk in a gas station is going to want to make.

Here in Florida we have the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services to inspect the gas pumps, pursuant to Florida Statute Chapter 531 – Weights and Measures. Their primary job, however, is to make sure that the amount pumped out is the proper amount received and charged.

However, I must wonder; between that division and the local fire departments is there really effective oversight on the safety aspects of these modern convenience store-gas station combos.

I think it is fair to say that the incidence of reporting of overflows, spills, and injuries is loosely regulated at best. Frankly, based on my research it is pretty much a self monitoring reporting system for the wrongdoer.

Yeah, I know, not likely to be all that effective. For additional legislative comfort, we have Florida Statute 526.141; which sets forth that the attendant at a self service station is to be “primarily” monitoring the pumps.

Do we really believe that is actually happening? What is happening is that in between the grocery sales, cigarette sales, numbers running and coffee peddling, the issue of flammable liquids and their inherent danger may be getting some fleeting thoughts. It appears the “attendants” or more like cashiers and stock persons; woefully undertrained, understaffed, and overworked. I have no doubt they are underpaid considering the seriousness of that for which they are “alleged” to be responsible.

Sorry, call me cynical but I have seen firsthand the fires and injuries.

Ok, so what to do?

Well you can look for the stains on the ground of old fuel spills, but that doesn’t really tell you how old or new they are.

Next, even though the store may be luring you in with signs of 2 for 1 burritos, don’t bite; at least until after you finished pumping the gas. Leaving the car unattended can make a bad situation worse.

Finally, if you notice an overflow problem, report it! Report it to the store and get the name of the person and a copy of the report but also notify the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the local Fire Dept. The links contained in this article and will help you see prior complaints but will also let you file a complaint “for the record”.

This extra effort will help keep people safe, save people money, and help the environment. Not a bad return on a modest effort. I am in favor of business, progress and technology, but not when it comes at the unnecessary expense of tragic injuries, loss of life and the safety of our families.

Yesterday, the administrator of the 20 Billion dollar Gulf Oil Spill Claims Fund, Ken Feinberg, was attending town hall meetings in Fort Walton Beach, Florida and will be addressing certain affected industries in Tampa, Florida.  He noted that over 70,000 people have filed for “quick claims” with the fund, an option that reportedly requires you to waive any future damages claims.  Since the experts appointed to assess the causes and consequences have found that the damages will be epidemic and on-going, one has to wonder at that sort of claim process.

On June 27^th, Co-Chairs of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon oil Spill and Offshore Drilling will be discussing their exclusive findings in Orlando, Florida.  Their comments on the report, which were released on January 11^th, have been made public as recently as yesterday.  In a recent interview, former Florida Governor Bob Graham stated that the oil spill “was not the product of some cosmic force. It was caused by human beings who made a series of bad decisions which were unnecessary.”  He also noted that while the industry has made huge strides in technology focused on getting oil out, they have never been concerned with making advances in dealing with any disasters that might occur.

Interestingly, Feinberg has not appeared to address the Commission’s report entitled “Deep Water, the Gulf Oil Diaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling.”  The report is large (over 350 pages) and has been available for over a week.  It sheds light on many topics of concern including:

a.) the causes of the disaster;

b.) the public consequence of what has largely been determined post-incident false reporting, and

c.) the need for greater regulatory oversight and scientific understanding of the potential impacts of the event.

A significant part of the report deals with the extent of the damage—a topic that many might assume is the fund’s domain.    Yet, as is implied by the commission’s report, the situation is far too complex for such a solution and far too vast for a fund to handle.  Unlike disasters of the past, the damage here was not actually caused by a single event; instead, it is as President Obama termed it, an “epidemic.”

If you are one of the many whose livelihood and/or life has been directly injured by the events, the jostling contradictions do nothing but add to your nauseating reality:  things are going to be worse before they are better.  In such situations, people have traditionally sought the advice of counsel.  Sadly, in this instance, many are being told that this dauntingly murky situation can be handled without expert guidance.  The report of the President’s own advisers implies otherwise.

President Obama created the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon oil Spill and Offshore Drilling on May 22, 2010.   As stated by the Commission itself, its task was to be an independent undertaking:

“The President charged the Commission to determine the causes of the disaster, and to improve the country’s ability to respond to spills, and the recommend reforms to make energy production safer.  And the President said we were to follow the facts wherever they led.”

Appropriately, the President appointed co-chairs for the commission:  Democrat Bob Graham, Florida’s former Governor and former Senator and Republican William K. Reilly, former EPA administrator under George H.W. Bush, and former president of the World Wildlife Fund.

On June 15^th, as cited in the Report, President Obama squarely addressed the reality of the situation facing the Commission and the nation entirely:

“Already, this oil spill is the worst environmental diaster America has ever faced.  And unlike an earthquake or a hurricane it’s not a single event that does it’s damage in a matter of minutes or days.  The millions of gallons of oil that have spilled into the Gulf of Mexico are more like an epidemic, one that we will be fighting for months, even years.”

After an “intense six-month effort to fulfill the President’s charge,” the facts led to many startlingly sad conclusions.   The news that such an atrocity could have been avoided and that a repeat of such an occurrence is still so likely is not at all surprising, but the sadness of that reality remains a shock to the system. Amidst its conclusions, the Commission offers snapshots of individuals whose lives have been turned upside down.  From the most obvious, such as fishermen and oyster farmers, to the more remote, like wedding coordinators, the commission seems to understand that amidst these large, sweepingly affective conclusions, individual victims will bear the cost.

The commission is also willing to confront the unknowns and the decisions that were made even more agonizing in light of our lack of knowledge.  For instance, the report discusses the angst in the decision to use dispersing chemicals when the effects of the chemicals were unknown; it acknowledges how that angst grows when the companies who make them have been unwilling to share what little information they have about them.

Of the many conclusions it draws, a few are of significance to the Gulf community and its advocates:

• The explosive loss of the Macondo could have been prevented.
• The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.
• Because regulatory oversight alone will not be sufficient to ensure adequate safety, the oil and gas industry will need to take its own unilateral steps to increase dramatically safety through the industry, including self-policing mechanisms that supplement government enforcement.
• Scientific understanding of environmental conditions in sensitive environments in deep Gulf waters, along the region’s coastal habitats, and in areas proposed for more drilling, such as the Arctic,  is inadequate.  The same is true of the human and natural impacts of oil spills.

So while the accident was foreseeable and could (and should) have been prevented, there is no way of knowing how big the impacts and injuries will be and there is little reassurance that it won’t happen again.  Usually when a corporation disregards safety, those who are wronged seek remedy in Court.  A jury of their peers determines the extent of the damage and, if relevant, the gravity of the wrong.  A judgement is then rendered that will not only remedy the injured, but will deter future calamities by bringing the corporate wrong-doer a fiscal awareness of the risks that they had previously put upon the public to suffer.  The hoped for and usually achieved reaction is that the relevant industry creates internal guidelines, procedures and policies that keep the risk from happening.  As the commission understands, and as their report states, regulations on their own just don’t do it.  If they had, we would not be in the mess we find ourselves in today.

In the face of a report stating that the injuries will be in the hundreds of billions of dollars; that we are still not certain even of the causative effects of the oil, the gas, the dispsersants and other pollutants; that the industry needs to find motivation to self-govern; and  that the industry let this happen through preventable mistakes, what’s the plan of action for remedying the whole thing?  What has happened?

Our politicians are considering opening more off-shore territory to oil drilling.  The fund would like you to think that the wrongdoers have fairly determined the limits of their liability to the public.  Administrator Feinberg has stated that the damages are not as far-reaching or great as we originally feared and that the fund will be able to fully compensate the injuries.    The Claims fund has created a “quick Pay” option which offers reasonably desperate claimants the right to a quick lump sum payment in exchange for a waiver.  BP’s link offers directions “For Info On How To Make A Claim w/out A Lawyer.”

The reaction is unequivocally contradictory:  The Commission and the President himself have stated that this is a long-term problem; meanwhile,  the fund and the industry act as though there is a “quick fix” option.  And although there are three claims options to choose from, each of which require documented causation, the wrongdoers are actually advising that you go through the process without an attorney, as though they have the injured community’s  interest at heart and individual counsel is superfluous.

Apparently, they have NEVER had the community’s interest at heart.  One has to wonder, in a situation where such learned politicians can recommend diametrically opposing view points, how can the average person find justice  without an attorney?

The “BP Fund Czar”, Kenneth Feinberg, says his staff has been interviewing officials at “government regulatory agencies” to determine how severe the impact of the largest oil spill in the history of the United States will actually be from a long term perspective.

There are at least a couple of noteworthy issues.

First, the largest oil spill in the history of the US has no historical comparisons from which we can make predictions; no models we can use to look into the future and predict what the damage to the environment will be. In large measure, the injury to the environment in the future drives the damages suffered by residents and business owners in the Gulf States, including Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. If we lack any reliable models, then how can any accurate comparisons or analogies be drawn to allow reliable predictions to be made.

Second, Mr. Feinberg is speaking to people in “government regulatory agencies”? These would presumably be the same agencies that allowed this disaster to happen? Why would the “BP Fund Czar” draw on information and opinions from bureaucrats when he has some of the most brilliant minds in the world available to him? Why would he not organize leading environmental, geologic and business experts to aid him in his conclusions?

Mr. Feinberg says that “he is finding mostly an optimistic view of the Gulf’s future”. Based on…?

The bureaucrats in the “government regulatory agencies” have a need to paint an optimistic future for damages flowing from the oil spill. From a “human nature” perspective they would want their actions and inactions to have the most minimal negative results possible. In addition, the administration would understandably like to solve everyone’s problems and the financial losses as quickly as they can.

Is it wise, a mere 9 months after an oil spill that saw over 205 million gallons of crude oil to free flow into a basin we call the Gulf of Mexico, to declare blue skies and calm seas?

As late as December, BP claimed that:

“They (the government agencies) rely on incomplete or inaccurate information, rest in large part on assumptions that have not been validated, and are subject to far greater uncertainties than have been acknowledged. BP fully intends to present its own estimate as soon as the information is available to get the science right.”

I am not suggesting that BP is a source of unadulterated or reliable information, but so far, reports are that the “government regulatory agencies” have offered as many as 10 different estimates of the extent of the oil spill.

So what can victims do who have suffered as a result of this oil spill? As difficult as it is: exercise caution in transacting claims with the BP Oil Spill Czar. I am not suggesting that everyone who has suffered damages needs to have a lawyer; for many that may be completely unnecessary.

Be aware, though, of what both the “Czar” and, in some respects the government, is trying to achieve:

They want victims to execute full, final and all encompassing releases of their claims. It may be that those who do execute such releases will be forever prevented from pursuing claims against ANY entity for future losses they did not or could not anticipate.

The oil spill happened on the watch of these “government regulatory agencies” and the worse the oil spill damage to environment and economy, the worse their performance as regulators appears.

It is in the best interest of BP and the government that this disaster be put behind everyone as expediently as possible. No one looks good and as time goes by it is reasonable to anticipate that more and more will be learned about why and how this happened.

In order to provide immediate response to victims’ claims and yet balance that against fairness to BP and the other companies who contributed to the oil spill, the government is understandably trying to perform a precarious balancing act over the interests to be protected.

If you intend to process your claims through the BP Oil Spill fund:

• Carefully compile all your losses.
• Carefully document your past losses.
• Look into the future and try to anticipate the losses you may suffer in the future.
• Consult experts (accountants, appraisers, people in your industry) to try and get a reasonable grasp on just what you, more likely than not, can expect into the future.
• Submit your claim.
• If you receive a response to your claim from the BP oil Fund, carefully evaluate what they are offering you.
• Seek the advice and consultation of anyone you feel you need and trust.

If you do not feel the Fund personnel are treating your claim fairly, consult an attorney. Find a good attorney who will give you good advice about what losses you can legally collect; the costs involved in litigating your claims; and the best judgment for the likelihood of success with your claim.

Good attorneys will not try and convince you to litigate claims that do not make sense to litigate, given your financial position or the ability to prove your damages. Good attorneys will not try and convince you to hire them and to file a lawsuit if that is really not in your best interests.

Again, simply exercise caution and understand that the BP Oil Fund employees are not working for you.

A well-site leader and BP employee testified before the US Coast Guard investigatory committee that there was a problem with a safety device on the drilling rig; he reported the problem; but drilling presumably continued in a complete disregard for any attention to the problem.

Ronald Sepulvado testified that he reported a problem with the control pod connected to the blow-out preventer and could not understand why drilling continued or the company ignored his report. Ironically, Mr. Sepulvado was not on board the rig at the time of the explosion because he was attending a blow-out preventer safety training program.

The best guess is Mr. Sepulvado is talking about the shuttle valve located inside the Blind Shear Ram on the drilling pipe. The operation of this unit, as well as the entire component, is superbly illustrated on the New York Times website. Once again, the Times provide wonderful insight into this issue.

A failure of the shuttle valve can result in a malfunction of the blind ram shear. Imagine the drill pipe going down to the well head at the bottom of the ocean and on the well head is a hydraulically activated set of arms that, in the event of an emergency, should activate to cut the drill pipe, crimp the end of the pipe where oil flows and create a seal to prevent oil from blowing out into the entire Gulf.

Illustration Courtesy of NY Times Website

The Blow-out preventer can be activated in essentially (4) ways:

• Electrical Control Signal: sent from the surface through a control cable;
• Acoustical Control Signal: sent from the surface based on a modulated/encoded pulse of sound transmitted by an underwater transducer;
• ROV Intervention: remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) mechanically control valves and provide hydraulic pressure to the stack (via “hot stab” panels);
• Deadman Switch / Auto Shear: fail-safe activation of selected BOPs during an emergency, and if the control, power and hydraulic lines have been severed.

In the United States waters, oil rig operators such as BP and owners, such as Transocean, are permitted to outfit the rigs with only electrical controls, avoiding the deployment of acoustical controls. The omission of acoustical controls transmits into a savings of up to $500,000 per unit. Since rigs sometimes require replacement of these units, omitting the acoustical control can actually result in even more savings.

We can only reflect and wish that BP or Transocean had seen the wisdom of employing all of the safety mechanisms available to have avoided this disaster or that BP had listened to the voice in the wilderness of its own employee, Ronald Sepulvado.

Do we have the perfect storm for an environmental catastrophe leading to an economic disaster? As the oil spill continues to grab headlines, Gulf coast leaders worry about the jobs and economic stimulus provided by the oil and gas industry.

Although releasing their fury on BP over the spill and its calamitous ecological effects, Louisiana politicians are promoting the oil and gas industry in its efforts to preserve offshore drilling against Washington’s efforts to place a moratorium on it.

Why? The oil and gas industry in the gulf accounts for nearly 1/3 of the nation’s domestic crude oil production, billions of dollars in revenue and is an essential economic backbone of the Gulf States economy. Balancing that dependence with tar balls washing up on shore lines, visions of oil-soaked animals and contaminated marshes against this loss of livelihood and a dreadful “Catch-22” situation emerges.

In response to rising public anxiety regarding offshore drilling, Interior Secretary, Ken Salazar, issued a new moratorium on deepwater drilling in the Gulf. The moratorium extends over the next four months in an effort by the administration to side-step judicial objections of a six month moratorium overturned by the federal court.

The moratorium would stop over 33 existing drilling projects in the Gulf and prevent new permits for offshore drilling. This would effectively, at least in Louisiana, leave over 100,000 workers unemployed. The ban on drilling could result in lost wages for employees of the drilling projects because offshore vessels and portable rigs will be diverted to other oil-rich areas in the world. Because of this, an understandably desperate Louisiana government has been opposed to the moratorium.

A temporary cap was placed on the leak on July 15, 2010 and, after nearing 90 days, oil has stopped gushing (temporarily). Presently, no significant additional oil is leaking from the well into the gulf. Scientists are testing the oil well to investigate where the leak needs to be permanently fixed. The best case scenario for BP is that the well will simply remain successfully capped. Currently, tests are being conducted by BP to find a permanent solution to capping the well.

Scientists are also trying to accurately assess how much oil has been spilled into the Gulf and how much more could be spilled. If the well is permanently capped, we will never know how much oil still remains in the well. Scientists working on the concealment of the well are aware of hurricane season and worry that it could stall any permanent fixes to the well. Out in the gulf today, there is an armada of coast guard vessels, skimmers, and other research vessels within a six mile radius.

Gulf citizens are cautiously optimistic about BP’s temporary cap on the well, but they are understandably distraught about the economic tidal wave they may now face.

What should be done to balance environmental interests against people’s livelihoods? Can we reach such a precarious and inapposite balance?

Is this perfect storm avoidable?

Hearings have been occurring in connection with the investigation of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and the Gulf Oil Disaster. Hearings have been held in New Orleans jointly by the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.

Many of the revelations coming out of the testimony at the hearings are interesting, but witnesses who have refused to appear or those who have been reticent to testify on certain matters are also of note.

A BP lawyer testified that the Deepwater Horizon had 390 “past due” maintenance items that should have been corrected and, which were found during a September 2009 audit of the rig. The lawyer testified that the corrections would have required 3,545 man hours to complete. All this data was set forth in a 30 page report submitted to the rig owner, Transocean, long before the tragic explosion on April 20, 2010.

Also testifying was Stephen Bertone, the chief engineer of the Deepwater Horizon rig. He testified that (8) months before the explosion the rig’s propeller that assisted in maneuvering the rig had been “having problems”. Bertone could not recall how many of the 390 deficiencies on the oil rig had been corrected before the explosion and subsequent oil spill.

Bertone also testified that he did not recall whether the general alarm had been bypassed, but did not recall hearing it go off. Bertone said he did not know whether the system for purging gas from the drill shack had been bypassed. This system was the one that kept gas from accumulating and what ultimately ended up igniting the massive explosion that did occur.

Stephen Bertone does recall that hours before the deadly blowout at BP’s Macondo well, a larger than normal number of crew members was gathered in the drilling control room on board the Deepwater Horizon.

“At that point I knew there was something going on, but I didn’t know what it was,” Bertone said.

The visit to the rig’s drill shack, where it was “standing room only,” took place about 5:30 pm, he said.

Later, shortly before 10 p.m., Bertone was reading in his bed when he heard what sounded like a freight train running through his room, then a boom. He felt thumping and saw the lights go out. That set up a chain of events that eventually led to a frenzied exit from the fiery rig.

Wouldn’t it be interesting to inquire with Bertone whether he may have asked, “gee, what is everyone here about” or “what’s the problem”, or hey, guys, what’s up”? Instead, all we know is he went to bed to read.

Bertone said he does recall reviewing an audit before the accident that found larger maintenance issues requiring Deepwater Horizon to go to the shipyard in early 2011 for work on thrusters, engines, seawater systems, ballast systems and drilling equipment.

Mike Williams, a subordinate of Stephen Bertone’s, suggested that some key safety functions on board the rig were set to bypass when the accident occurred.

BP’s well-site manager, Donald Vidrine, declined to testify at the hearings; reportedly due to health concerns.

So far, what we have in the testimony seems to be a frightening inventory of neglect and carelessness on at least the part of the rig operator, BP and the rig owner, Transocean. There seems to be at least some scintilla of suspicion that any of the neglected problems on the Deepwater Horizon may have cause d or contributed to this tragedy. There also seems to be some concern that memories are not as sharp as maybe we had hoped or honesty is in short supply.

The Gulf Oil disaster should not be a place for political bents or muckraking – should it?

I just read two articles from the Financial Post; one I take with a bit of skepticism over whether it portrays the whole story fairly and the other is, well simply unbelievable.

In the first article, author Lawrence Solomon begins with the title “Avertible Catastrophe” and it is, before reading it, about the BP Oil Disaster. He begins the article by applauding the preparedness and capability of the Dutch to anticipate “looming catastrophe and know how to head it off”. It seems pretty clear that in the Netherlands, they take oil drilling and the attendant risks it presents very seriously. They are prepared for disaster. The Dutch know how to handle disastrous oil spills.

Mr. Solomon then goes on to explain the substantial offers to help made by the Dutch and the repeated refusals to those offers of help made by our government. Mr. Solomon is critical of Americans, the US government, US environmental rules, US labor unions, and, possibly, US workers.

(more…)

The families of the 11 victims of the Deepwater Horizon disaster faced severe limitations on their ability to seek justice for the tragic loss of their loved ones due to the negligence of BP and others. That was the case under the law before the House passed the SPILL Act (Securing Protections for the Injured from Limitations on Liability).

The SPILL ACT will actually correct the state of the law in a number of worthy areas that relate to the Gulf Disaster:

• Amends the Death on the High Seas Act to permit the recovery of non-economic damages; human damages, including the pain & suffering of families of the dead workers.
• Amends the Jones Act to permit the recovery of non-economic damages.
• Repeals the limitation of liability for vessel owners; limiting recovery to only the value of the vessel involved.
• Amends the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) to make clear that states damaged by the Gulf Disaster can bring lawsuits and seek remedies in their own state courts.
• Makes contracts and agreements “gagging” individuals from disclosing information about offshore oil spills and discharge of other pollutants; agreements that reportedly BP attempted to enforce.
• Amends the US Bankruptcy Code preventing corporations liable for oil spills from severing their assets to avoid liabilities owed to injured victims. Among other things, the Act eliminates the ability for the debtor to seek additional protections afforded under Chapter 15 of the code.

The SPILL Act takes outdated laws and brings them into the 21^st century, according to House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi:

“The SPILL ACT will modernize these laws to ensure that BP and other responsible parties are held fully accountable for their actions and to ensure that families of those killed or injured in the BP oil spill and other such tragedies are justly compensated.”

The passage of this bill eliminates a few of the tools that responsible parties likely planned to use in an effort to limit the damages they owe to injured victims of the Gulf Disaster.

If the tort reformers are not hypocrites, they are likely to oppose these changes as victimizing corporations. If tort reformers avoid hypocrisy in this instance, one must wonder how they justify their position in this illustration of where going “easy” on corporate America has gotten us. If tort reformers are hypocrites in this instance, why listen to them about anything?

“Operate to failure” is reportedly BP Oil’s instructions to employees in the operation of its oil drilling locations. Reportedly, that means BP runs equipment until it breaks down before spending any money on upkeep.

This information was reported today in an article discussing the investigation of conditions existing in a BP operation in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. This is a BP operation, which has already suffered two previous oil spills and employees there predict the potential for a spill that “could rival the havoc in the Gulf”. The most recent spill occurred in November of 2009 and resulted in 45,828 gallons (1,091 barrels) of oil material deposited on the pristine Prudhoe environment.

A man who has been an employee of BP for over 30 years stated that, “The condition of the [Prudhoe Bay] field is a lot worse and in my opinion a lot more dangerous. We still have hundreds of miles of rotting pipe ready to break that needs to be replaced. We are totally unprepared for a large spill.”

TruthOut reported the testimony of an employee who wished anonymity due to fear of reprisal:

“With minimum manning in maintenance and operations we are basically running a broken plant with too few people to address the problems in a timely and safe manner,” the employee said. “Operations can not rely on Management to provide them with a safe and reliable plant to work in. The management of our maintenance at [Lisburne Production Center] simply is not working to maintain a safe operation. This gap in maintenance management causes problems that increase the overall risk of plant integrity and personnel safety.”

Back in the Gulf, we have heard repeated reports of malfunctioning equipment; cutbacks on safety; dead batteries on the blow out equipment; and an overall inadequate design in safety devices.

Back in the Gulf, BP has not spilled a thousand barrels of oil, they continue to spew 20,000 barrels every single day.

From the reports we have seen so far, it seems pretty clear that the same “operate to failure” theme that seems to exist in Prudhoe Bay was also practiced at the Deepwater Horizon well.

What is perhaps more disturbing is that the “industry standards” described by oil officials in testimony before Congress, sound more like minimum effort – maximum profit thinking from the entire industry.

What should we have been able to expect?

As I have suggested in previous articles, my oversight of BP and the rest of Big Oil would have involved:

The Deepwater Horizon Oil Disaster that continues to dump 20,000 to 40,000 barrels of oil everyday into the Gulf poses more questions than answers. We still do not know how it happened or whether BP will pay for its reported drive for profits over safety.

President Obama’s latest effort to insure BP’s financial liability has led him to press BP to set up a fund, of up to $20 billion, from which those harmed, might be reimbursed. This tactic emerged in the wake of fears that the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 would cap BP’s liability at $75 million. If it can be shown that BP committed gross negligence or violated applicable safety standards, the cap, however, will be pierced.

A June 14th letter from the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce to BP CEO Tony Hayward outlines some of BP’s gross negligence:

• Using a well design that had few barriers to gas flow; BP had two options when installing the final section of steel tubing the day before the blowout. It could lower a string of “casing” from the top of the wellhead to the bottom of the well or hang a “liner” from the lower end and install a “tieback” on top of the liner. A BP plan prepared days before the blowout advised against the “casing” tactic, but BP chose to pursue that method because the liner-tieback option would cost $7-10 million more and delay drilling three days longer.
• Failing to use an adequate number of centralizers to prevent channeling during the cement process; BP knew that the well could have a SEVERE gas flow problem, if BP used only six centralizers instead of 21. Centralizers are attachments that fit around the casing to keep it in the center of the borehole while it is being lowered. One BP official noted, in an e-mail on April 16, that the 10 hours it would take to install the extra centralizers was too much time.
• Failing to run a cement bond log to determine the effectiveness of the cement job; BP’s mid-April plan predicted that the cement process would fail; however, BP did not take the time to run a cement bond log, a 9-12 hour procedure, which would have established whether the cement had bonded correctly with the casing. Nine to 12 hours, the $128,000 cost of the test, and remediation of any discovered problems were apparently too great of a sacrifice for BP to make. An independent expert hired by the Congressional Committee stated that not preforming the test when using a single casing method was “unheard of” and “horribly negligent.”
• Failing to fully circulate possible gas-bearing drilling muds out of the well; this procedure would have permitted workers to test for influxes of gas, allowed a controlled release of gas pockets, and guaranteed removal of well cuttings. Though this process is recommended by the American Petroleum Institute, BP only partially circulated the mud, saving 12 hours.
• Failing to install a casing hanger lockdown sleeve that would have stopped the seal from being blown out from below and secured the well.

All signs point to what many have believed; BP sacrificed safety, the environment, and the interests of the American people in an effort to turn a larger profit at a faster pace. The contents of the Committee’s letter to the BP CEO indicate that BP was grossly negligent and likely violated applicable safety standards. What is even more likely is that these actions only represent the “tip of the iceberg in this tragic story.